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1. SUMMARY: Whether a shareholder's derivative action 
under §36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 is exempt from 
--- -
the director demand requirement of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.1. 
2. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS: Resp, a minority shareholder in a 
money market fund, instituted this derivative action under §36(b) 
~
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 u.s.c. §80a-35(b), 
,.-:--
~ ~--~- c.~ ~ -~ ~ - ~tu--c_{ 




against petrs (the fund and its investment advisor) to recover 
allegedly excessive advisory fees. No demand was made by the 
resp on the directors of the fund. Petrs therefore moved to 
dismiss the action for failure by resp to comply with the 
director demand requirement of Rule 23.1, 1 and that motion was ....___ ____ _ 
granted by the District Court. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that Rule C J1 '2-
23.1 does not apply to actions brought under §36(b). The court 
reasoned that §36(b) actions are not derivative because an 
investment company does not itself possess the right to bring an 
action against its advisor for return of allegedly excessive 
fees. The Rule 23.1 demand requirement applies only when a 
I corporation has "failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.1. Thus, if the fund -----., 
may not sue pursuant to §36(b), no demand upon its board of 
directors is required. The second sentence of §36(b) states that 
an action may be brought only "by the [Securities and Exchange] 
Commission, or b~ecu_: ii;Y holde s of [a] registered investment 
1The demand requirement of Rule 23.1 provides: "The 
complaint shall also allege with part1cularitythe efforts, if 
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from 
the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the 
shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to 
obtain the action or for not making the effort." The requirement 
finds its origin in Equity Rule 94, 104 U.S. IX (1882), which 
adopted the Court's holding in Hgwes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 
(1881), that "before the shareh~der is perm1tted in his own name 
to institute and conduct a litigation which usually belongs to 
the corporation, he should show to the satisfaction of the court 
that he has exhausted all the means within his reach to obtain, 
within the corporation itself, the redress of his grievances, or 
action in conformity to his wishes." 104 u.s., at 460-461. 
( 
( 
company on behalf of such company." No action by the investment 
company is authorized. The legislative history of the Act 
indicates that the relationship of a fund to its investment 
advisor makes it "a part of the problem in a way that precludes 
it from being part of the solution" and hence the investment 
company was not intended to possess a right of action under 
§36(b). In addition, the board of directors of an investment 
company, unlike the boards in other derivative suits, have no 
power to terminate a §36(b) action. Finally, the delay caused by 
the director demand process may have the untoward result of 
precluding full recovery of excessive fees while the directors 
determine whether they had acted against the interest of 
shareholders, because §36(b) expressly limits recovery to 
excessive fees paid up to one year prior to the commencement of 
suit. Thus, for the above reasons, in the context of a §36(b) 
law suit, the director demand requirement would be "an empty, 
unfruitful and dilitory exercise." 
3. CONTENTIONS: The decision below creates a conflict 
between the circuits, involves an important and unsettled 
------------~ 
question of federal law, and is erroneous. The decision below 
conflicts directly with Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (CA 1), 
cert. denied, 103 s.ct. 85, No. 81-2361 (1982), and Weiss v. 
Temporary Investment Fund, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep., ~98, 865 (CA 3) 
2 Nov. 12, 1982. The First and Third Circuits rejected every 




argument relied on by the Court of Appeals below, and held that a 
demand on the directors is required in a shareholder's action 
brought under §36(b). 
In view of the oversight role with respect to advisory fee s 
which Congress gave to the unaffiliated directors of an 
investment company, the policy of exhaustion of intracorporate 
remedies has especially clear application to shareholders' 
derivative actions brouqht under §36(b). If the directors find 
the shareholders' claim has merit, they can negotiate with the 
advisor to obtain a return of fees, terminate the contract if th 
advisor refuses, or institute a ~36(b) action. 
The court erred in construing Congress' silence on an 
implied corporate right of action as indicating an intent to 
deprive an investment company of the right to bring such an 
action. An implied corporate right of action would further the 
purpose of the Act. In addition, the state of the law at the 
~
time Congress enacted §36(b) constitutes a background against 
which Congress should be presumed to have known that an 
investment company had its own right of action against its 
advisor. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102 ~~ , 
s.ct. 1825 (1982). ~
~~ 
Even if an investment company does not have a right of ~~
action under §36(b), a shareholder's action under that provision~ 
is still derivative and mu~t be preceded by a director demand. 
The statute authorizes shareholders to bring an action against an 
investment advisor "on behalf of" an investment company; this 
language clearly makes a shareholder's action derivative. Burkes 
( 
( 
v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477 (1979), referred to §36 (b) suits as 
"derivative." Id., at 484. 
Resp acknowledges the Circuit Court conflict, but maintains 
that it is not of sufficient importance to warrant review because 
the director cannot terminate an action brought under §36(b). 
Moreover, the decision below is correct because where express 
remedies are created in some detail, as in §36(b), there should 
be no additional implied rights of action. The Court's holding 
in Burkes v. Lasker that a §36(b) action may not be terminated by 
a court simply because the board of directors urge it to do so 
reflects Congress' feeling that reliance on the board was 
ineffective in checking excessive advisory fees. Resp also notes 
that this circuit conflict was present when the Court denied 
rehearing in Grossman v. Fidelity Municipal Bond Fund, supra, on 
January 10, 1983. 
4. DISCUSSION: There is a direct conflict between the 
decision below and the decisions reached by the First and Third 
Circuits. The Second Circuit in this case noted that its 
decision conflicted with that of CA 1 in Grossman, and CA 3 noted 
in Weiss that its decision conflicted with that of the Second 
Circuit in this case. No conflict existed when the Court denied 
cert in Grossman and the petition for rehearing was untimely. As 
the parties' contentions indicate, there are strong arguments on 
both sides of the issue. If there is serious question about 
whether the conflict is sufficiently important in terms of the 
federal statute to justify review, the views of the Solicitor 
General could be requested. In light of the direct conflict 
involving three decisions rendered in 1982, and on a subject 
which would appear to be the source of much litigation in the 
future, I recommend a GRANT. I see no jurisdictional problem; 
only one question is presented. 
There is a response. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Daily Income Fund v. Fox 
No. 82-1200 
David A. Charny November 5, 1983 
Question Presented 
Whether a shareholder who brings suit to challenge 
advisory fees under section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, 
15 u.s.c. § 80a-35(b), must first make demand upon the company's 
board of directors. 
Outline 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
B. Facts and Proceedings Below 
II. Discussion 
A. Substantive Requirements of Rule 23.1 
B. Applicability of Rule 23.1 
c. Policy Arguments Concerning a Demand Requirement 









A. Statutory Background 
The Investment Company Act of 1940, now codified at 15 
u.s.c. § 80a-l et seq., was passed to regulate widespread abuses 
in the investment company industry. Investment companies are 
generally organized by another entity which appoints the board of 
directors and contracts with the company to manage its assets and 
to sell its shares. The 1940 Act was aimed at the grosser forms 
of its abuse which this structure permitted: dealing of the 
managers with corporate assets on terms unfair to the company; 
fraud in the sales of shares; excessive issuance of debt; and 
outright theft. The Act required registration of securities, 
limited companies' debt, required that directors otherwise 
unaffiliated with the company or its investment adviser sit on 
the board, and restricted transactions between the company and 
persons "affiliated" with it. 
With the growth of investment companies after 1940, 
problems arose from more subtle conflicts of interest regarding 
compensation for services provided to the investment company 
brokerage commissions, sales loads, and advisory fees. The 
--------~ 
present suit involves determination of advisory fees. These fees 
were generally a fixed proportion of the total assets of the 
company. As companies grew, so did the total fee, although the 
costs of providing advisory services vary little with the size 
the company. Although fees arrangements that might originally 
have been reasonable later became excessive, the board of 
directors did not re-negotiate the contract because it was 
~~ 
dominated by the advisor. Shareholder suits were ineffective · ~ 
because of the stringent standards for proving "waste" of ~
~~ corporate assets. 
11'7~ * 
The 1970 amendments to section 36 of the Investment ~~~~~~ 
Company Act, 15 u.s.c. § 80a-35(b}, aimed at this problem. The ) 
amendments stipulated that the investment adviser had a fiduciary 
...... ______.... 
duty with respect of receipt of compensation and authorized 
shareholders or the SEC to sue investment advisors to recover 
excessive fees for the corporation. This case raises the 
question whether the shareholder must demand action from the ~ 
company directors before brining suit under this section. 
B. Facts and Proceedings Below 
Resp, a shareholder in petr Daily Income Fund, an 
investment company, brought suit against petr Reich & Tang, Inc, 
petr Fund's investment adviser. The suit, brought on behalf on 
the Fund under section 36(b} of the Investment Company Act of 
1940, 15 u.s.c. § 80a-35(b}, alleged that Reich & Tang had 
charged excessive fee for its advisory services. Reich & Tang's 
fee was set at one-half of one percent of the Fund's net assets. 
Assets increased from $75 million in 1978 to $775 million in 
1981; and the investment advisory fees increassed from $375,000 
to $3,875,000. The complaint alleged that the work done by Reich 
& Tang for the company had not changed during this period. 
Resp did not make any demand upon the Fund's directors.~) 
~'A••""'-
The DC dismissed for failure to comply with the demand 
requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1. After reviewing the 
purposes of Investment Company Act, the DC noted that demand on 
the directors would permit them to seek redress without resort to 
litigation or to institute a suit themselves. Further, the 
statute should be construed to harmonize with the Federal Rules 
if possible, and the court found no evidence in the legislative 
history that a demand requirement woud interfere with the 
regulation of investment advisory fees. Finally, the court noted 
that the Act provided that director approval of advisory fees 
"shall be given such consideration by the court as is deemed 
appropraite under all the circumstances." 15 u.s.c. § 80a-
35{b) {2). A demand requirement would provide an opportunity for 
such deliberation. The DC then found that failure to make demand 
upon the fund's directors could not excused in the circumstances 
of this case. 
The CA 2 {Judge Kaufman writing for Judges Friendly and ~~ 
. b ) d . h 2 3 1 . d 1 . f h /-'.4~ Fe1n erg reverse • Not1ng t at rule .1 app 1e on y 1 t e 
shareholder suit sought to enforce a right which could be ~/9~~ 
asserted by the corporation itself, theCA held that section ~ 
36{a) did not create a cause of action for the investment fund to 
recover fees. The language of the statute contained no 
suggestion of such a cause of action, and the legislative history 
confirmed that a corporate right of action was not contemplated 
because Congress considered that the investment fund's directors 
were too closely tied to the investment adviser to be expected to 
prosecute a suit for recovery of excessive fees. Finally, the 
court noted that its conclusion was consistent with the policies 
of section 36{b). A demand requirement would unjustifiably delay 
suit and thereby preclude complete recovery, and would serve 
little purpose because the directors could not decide to bring 
suit themselves and could not decide to 'terminate the suit. 
The decision of the CA 2 is in conflict with those in 
Grossman v. Johnson 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir. 1982), and Weiss v. 
Temporary Investment Fund, 692 F.2d 928 (3rd. Cir. 1982). 
II. Discussion 
A. Substantive Requirements of Rule 23.1 
The government initially suggests that rule 23.1 is only 7 
a rule of pleading and imposes no substantive requirement that a 
demand be made. Therefore, the question in this case should 
properly be posed as whether the common law rule requiring demand 
will be imported into these derivative actions. 
While the terms of Rule 23.1 might be read to impose 
only a requirement that the plaintiff plead with particularity 
whatever demand he chooses to make upon the directors, the lower 
courts have consistently interpreted the rule to impose a 
.. I 
substantive requirement that the plaintiff carry an initial 
bu~~emonstrat[ing] why the directors are incapable of~ 
~.,...~44 
doing their duty." Heit v. Bird, 567 F.2d 1157 (1st Cir. 1977): ~
In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir. ~ 
C~c,L 
1973): Brody v. Chemical Bank, 482 F.2d 1111, 1113-1114 (2d Cir.~ 
1973). In contrast, rule 23.l's requirement that plaintiffs make~ 
demand "if necessary" upon the shareholders or members has been 
interpreted to require demand only if required by the relevant 
~tate or federal substantive law. See ~ody, supra, at 1114: 7A 
vfwright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, at§ 1832. 
This distinction between demand on shareholders and directors 
suggests that courts have deliberately construed the rule 23.1 
requirement of demand on directors as a 'requirement imposed 
directly by federal law, not simply adopted by reference to law 
that provides the basis for the shareholders cause of action. 
v"'" 
The Court's discussion of the rule in Cohen v. 
Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 u.s. 541, 556 (1949) also implies that 
the rule embodies a direct requirement that demand be made. The 
~r 
r'l:ri'e construes the rule to require that the plaintiff "set forth 
the facts showing that the plaintiff has endeavored to obtain his 
remedy through the corporation itself." The Court went on to 
note that the provision so construed "neither create[s] nor 
exempt[s] from liabilities " Contrary to the government's 
submission on this issue, the demand requirement does not detract 
from any substantive right of the plaintiff. It merely requires 
that if a plaintiff wishes to bring an action in federal court 
which may properly be brought by the corporation itself, the 
plaintiff must first show good reason that the corporation itself 
would not be expected to bring the action. 
Thus, the courts below correctly assume that a suit 
under section 36(b) is derivative and therefore triggers the rule 
23.1 demand requirement unless the section 36(b) accomplishes an 
~ ~ implied repeal of rule 23.1. Further, even if section 36(b) is 
~~ot ~rivative, Congress may have intended that a demand 
~~uirement be enforced in this cause of action to enforce the 
~ policies behind the Act. I shall consider these points in turn. 
~ 
, .. 
B. Applicability of Rule 23.1 
I~ 
Whether section 36 (b) creates oy· implication a cause of 
action for the corporation is a question of congressional intent. 
Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 u.s. 11, 15-16 
(1979} • It seems clear that Congress did not create such a ~ ~ 
remedy here. First, while section 36(b} explicitly creates 
rights of sction on the part of the SEC and individual security 
holders, it gives absolutely no indication that the corporation 
has a right of action. As the Court has frequently observed, 
clear contrary evidence of legislative intent is required to 
overcome the presumption that the express provision by Congress 
for one remedy precludes implication of other remedies by the 
courts. See National RR Passenger Corp. v. National Assn of RR 
Passengers (Amtrak}, 414 u.s. 453, 458 (1974}; Middlesex County 
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 u.s. 1, 
14-15 (1981}; Texas Indust. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 
630, 640 n.ll (1981}. Further, it is particularly remarkable 
that Congress did not include any reference to suit by the 
investment company itself or of derivative suits by shareholders 
enforcing the company's rights, because, as the SG notes, earlier 
drafts of the law contained such provisions. SG Brief at 18-19. 
Nor is there any mention of a demand requirement of the 
statute itself. Although Congress expressly indicated that 
approval of the contract by the board of directors of an 
investment company "shall he given such consideration by the 
court as is deemed appropriate," 15 u.s.c. § 80a-35(b} (2}, the 
statute contains absolutely no intimation that Congress expected 
/ 
' .v-
that some action by the Board of director would be forth corning 
before a suit was filed under the Act. 
Petrs concede, as did the courts of appeals which found 
that there was an implied right of action in the company, that 
there is no explicit indication in the legislative history of 
intent to create this right. See Weiss, 692 F.2d, at 935. 
Rather, the courts contend that the legislative silence indicates 
that "Congress did not intend to restrict company's right to 
sue." Id.; Grossman, 694 F.2d at 120. First, it is contended 
that Congress meant to preserve the pre-1970 law, under which 
there was a common law action for corporate waste under the law 
of the states, and an implied derivative right of action under 
section 36. E.g., Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st. Cir. 
1971). Second, given the requirement that suit must be brought 
"on behalf of the investment company," "it was unnecessary to say 
with particularity that the company" had a statutory cause of 
action. A suit on behalf of the company .•• is normally a 
derivative action that the company could itself bring." 
The first argument relies upon the holding of Merrill ~~ 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 u.s. 353, 381-382~ 
(1982) that when Congress "left intact the statutory provisions 
under which the federal courts had implied a cause of action," 
Congress intended to "preserve" that cause of action. Whatever 
the merits of this argument, compare id., at 408 (JUSTICE POWELL, 
dissenting) (theory is "inconsistent with the theory and 
structure of our constituitonal government"), it is inapplicable 




Unlike the provision at issue in Merrill 
·'· 
Lynch, section 36(b) is not "left intact" from previous 
legislation; it is totally new. 
Further, Congress expressly indicated that it did not 
consider that section 36(b) codified the implied derivative 
action of such cases as Moses v. Burgin, which had relied on the 
language now in section 36(a), but created a distinct right. 
"Although section 36(b) provides for an equitable action for 
breach of fiduciary duty as does section 36(a), the fact that 
subsection (b) specifically provides for private right of action 
should not be read by implication to affect subsecton (a)." S. 
Rep. 91-184, at 16 (1969). Section 36(b) creates and provides 
for enforcment of a specific fiduciary duty on the part of 
investment advisors with respect to compensation, in contrast to 
the general duties of officers addressed by old section 36, and 
present section 36(a), of the Act. Id. at 6-7. Thus, Congress 
considered section 36(b) provides for suit to enforce a right of 
the corporation not previously recognized either in state law or 
in the private cause of action for misconduct of corporate 
officers under old rule 36. 
Finally, the section 36(b) action would not be 
derivative of the state law cause of action for waste. The terms 
of rule 23.1, as well as the purposes behind the demand 
requirement, strongly suggest that a shareholder suit is 
ll " derivative when the shareholder seeks to enforce the same right 
:=;;;:;;----as the corporation itself could enforce if it chose to bring suit 
after demand was made. The suggestion of amicus Investment 
Company Institute to the contrary, see Amicus Br. ·at 10, is 
.. 
unsupported by the cases. Further, the legislative history 
condemns state law suits as inadequate to vindicate the company's 
interests because of the stringent requirements for proof of 
"waste." Sees. Rep., at 5. It would therefore be particularly 
anomalous in this case to consider the shareholder's federal 
cause of action derivative of that provided to the corporation 
under state law. 
The Act's use of the phrase "on behalf of such company," 
does suggest a congressional understanding that the suit is 
derivative. Although the CA below argued that the phrase 
indicated only that the plaintiff must "seek return of excessive 
management fees to the company treasury and not to individual or 
governmental coffers," it seems natural to assume that, if the 
corporation has the right to receive this recovery, it has a 
right to sue for it on its own behalf. 
Although this point is troubling, petr's argument seems 
to mistake the limits on the exercise of federal court 
jurisdiction and the corresponding requirements for creation of 
the cause of action. While section 36(b) well may indicate that 
Congress recognized that the investment company had a right not 
to pay excessive fees, this recognition does not resolve the 
question whether Congress intended to open the federal courts to 
suits by the company asserting this right require prior demand 
upon directors. As noted above, section 36(b) creates a distinct 
right, and there is no indication that Congress intended this 
right to be enforced in any way but those specifically provided 
by that section. Given the care with which Congress indicates 
that it is creating a new cause of action with respect to a new 
federally-created right, it seems anomalous that Congress 
intended the corporation itself did bring suit for the right in 
federal court, but simply assumed that this was so obvious that 
it would neither provide a basis for jurisdiction or for the 
cause of action in the relevant section. 
C. Policy Arguments Concerning a Demand Requirement 
Even if Congress did not create a right of action for 
which section 36(b) is derivative, Congress might have intended 
that a demand requirement be imposed in order to further the 
purposes of the Act. The CA below correctly determined however { 
that on balance the demand requirement woud hinder rather than 
--~--
aid effective enforcement of section 36(b). ~ • 
~.. ~ 
The primary purpose of the demand requirement is ~~
permit the corporation itself to control litigation purportedly . ----y 
conducted on its behalf. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 u.s. 450, 460-461 
(1882): Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder 
Derivative Actions, 44 U Chi L. Rev. 168, 171 (1976). "[T]he 
focus at the demand stage should be on the issue of whether the 
corporation may take over the suit and either prosecute it or 
adopt other internal corrective measures ••.• At the demand stage, 
the possibility should not be foreclosed that a demand will 
induce the board to consider issues and crystallize policies 
which otherwise might not be given attention .•.• "ALI 
Restatement on Principles of Corporate Governance and Structures 
~
§ 7.02, at 270-271 (1982). 
As a matter of policy, whether to impose a demand 
requirement in the present case depends 'upon competing views of 
the role of the board of directors. On the one hand, as the CA 3 
emphasized, Congress in 1970 intended to "enhance the 
independence of directors and their responsibility for advisory 
fees." It did so by expanding the class of those "interested 
persons," id. §80a-2(19) (previously termed "affiliated persons") 
who can constitute no more than 60% of the investment company 
board of directors. 15 u.s.c. § 80a-10. Congress retained the 
provisions of the 1940 Act which required that contracts with 
advisers be approved annually by a vote of the board of directors 
(or of the shareholders), id., § 80a-15(a) (2), and be terminable 
by a vote of the board with six days' notice to the adviser, id., 
par. (3). Congress clearly intended that the board undertake an 
active role in supervising fees paid to advisers. A demand 
requirement might help the board fulfill this responsibility. If 
a shareholder made demand upon the board, the board might obviate 
the need for suit by insisting that the investment adviser either 
refund the excessive payments or have his contract terminated. 
On the other hand, the board's power to control the suit 
is limited. The board does not have the power to terminate the 
suit, see Burks v. Lasker, 441 u.s. 471, 484 (1979) (construing 
section 36(b) (2)), and, as argued above, cannot bring suit 
itself. (If it could, the shareholder suit would be derivative 
and the present discussion would be superfluous.) Further, the 
legislative history seems to indicate, contrary to the assumption 
of the CA 3, that Congress did not expect that the board would 
not use the measures available to it to curb advisory fee abuses. 
The basic outlines of the regulations ori the board of directors 
were in place with the 1940, and Congress found that these had 
not effectively checked the specific problems at which the 1970 
amendments were addressed. s. Rep. No. 91-184, at 6. Indeed, 
the provisions of the 1940 had not been intended to do so, as 
they were aimed at "unfair capital strucures and ••• dishonest 
securities transactions with insiders" rather than "managerial 
compensation." H. Rep. No. 2337, at 66 (1966) (Report of the SEC 
on Investment Company Growth). 
Further, Congress did not think of the 1970 reforms that 
strengthened the independence of the Board as solutions to the 
conflict of interest regarding managerial compensation. Neither 
the House nor the Senate reports make any connection between the 
changes in the definition "interested persons" and the problem of 
management fees. Indeed, while the Senate report gives great 
emphasis to the provision for shareholder suits, it does not even 
mention the "interested persons" requirement in its summary 
discussion of the bill. Sees. Rep., at 5-13. And the 
legislative history indicates that the board was not thought to 
be free, as a practical matter, to terminate established 
management relationships when differences arose over 
compensation. For that reason, "even a requirement that all of 
the directors of an externally managed investment company be 
persons unaffiliated with the company's adviser-underwriter would 
not be an effective check on advisory fees and other forms of 
management compensation." H. Rep. No. 2337, at 148. If 
I 
conflicts of interest make "arms-length bargaining between the 
unaffiliated irectors and the managers . · .~wholly unrealistic" in 
the first instance, id., it is difficult to see why Congress 
would have expected the boards more effectively to protect the 
company's interests once a demand has been made upon the board. 
Nowhere does the legislative history indicate that 
Congress explicitly considered whether the board might be 
responsive to a shareholder demand made in anticipation of suit. 
Such demand might spur effective action at least in a few cases. 
But because the investment advisors' contract must be approved 
every year after the first two years, any demand for suit will 
follow closely upon a decision by the board that the contract was 
in the best interests oft the corporation. Further, as theCA 2 
observed, the one-year statute of limitations on recoveries, 15 
u.s.c. § 80a-35(b) (3) means that delay while the demand is 
considered prevents the company from fully recovering excessive 
profits. 
Thus, the advantages of the demand requirement in this 
context are not so apparent that the Court should construe the 
provision that the shareholder sues "on behalf of" the company, 
or section 36(b) as a whole, to require demand upon the board. I 
do not think that Congress simply assumed that the courts would 
impose such a requirement as a matter of course. Where Congress 
has wished to impose a demand requirement for shareholder suits 
created by statute, it has explicitly imposed such a requirement. 
See 15 u.s.c. § 78p(b) (shareholder suing to recover insider 
"short swing" profits for the corporation only "if the issuer 
shall fail or refuse to bring such suit ••• after request .•• "). 
' . 
Particularly where Congress, in creating a shareholder cause of 
action, .has addressed in detail such matters as the appropriate 
~
parties, the limits on recovery, the weight to be given to the 
board of directors vote, and the power of the board of director 
to terminate the suit, it seems unlikely that Congress would 
leave the demand requirement to be inferred by judicial 
construction. 
III. Conclusion 
Because the section 36(b) shareholder action is not 
derivative, section 23.1 does not require that the shareholder 
'~------~-
make demand upon the board before bringing suit. Nor do the 
terms of section 36{b) indicate that Congress intended directly 
to impose such a requirement. For these reasons, the judgment 
below should be affirmed • 
. ~ 
lfp/ss 11/07/83 INCOME SALLY-POW 
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MEMO TO FILE: 
This memo, dictated without the benefit of a 
bench memo, merely summarizes my tentative view at this 
time. 
The case is an interesting one: a derivative 
action brought by respondent, a shareholder in petitioner 
money market fund, under §36(b) of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940. Although the fund was a named defendant, the -
principal defendant was its investment adviser whose fees 
had soared in excess of $2 million. The suit was to 
recover excessiver advisory fees as authorized by §36(b). 
No demand was made by respondent on the 
directors of the fund prior to bringing the derivative 
suit. On a motion to dismiss for this reason, the DC held 
that the plaintiff (respondent here) had failed to make a 
demand on the fund as required by Rule 23.1. CA2 
reversed, holding that Rule 23.1 does not apply to actions 
brought under §36(b). That section was added to the 
Investment Company Act in 1970 specifically for the 
purpose of authorizing stockholder suits against 
investment advisers. In pertinent part §36(b) provides: 
~· t 
"An action may be brought under this subsection 
by the Commission, or by a security holder •.. 
on behalf of such company, against such 
investment adviser • . . or any other person . . 
• who has a fiduciary duty • . for breach of 
[that] fiduciary duty in respect to compensation 
or payments paid to such investment 
adviser." 
Rule 23.1 that normally requires a demand on the 
board of directors, was held by CA2 not to be applicable 
in view of the express language of §36(b). 
Siting my opinion in Sea Clammers, CA2 declined 
to infer a private right of action by the investment 
company itself: 
provided ~peci f ic--!,nd 
rov1s1ons, and entrusted 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
their use to part1cu ar partrcular parties, we 
will not lightly assume an unexpressed intention 
to create additional ones". (citing Sea 
Clammers) . 
There was, at the time of the CA2 suit, a 
contrary decision by the First Circuit: Grossman v. 
Johnson. CA2 rejected CAl's reasoning in Grossman. Since 
CA2's decision, however, CA3 has agreed with CAl. 
My tentative view is that CA2 is correct: that 
no private cause of action may be inferred against the 
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF t/}v )'L ) 7 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT / .J 
4 
. 
[January-, 1984] ......., ~ 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question for decision is whether Rule 23.1 of the Fed- L.-z._. ~ 
eral Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an investment ~ &...., 
company security holder first make a demand upon the com-
pany's board of directors before bringing an action under /.2 ~'-< ~ v 
§ 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA or Act) 
to recover allegedly excessive fees paid by the company to its 
investment adviser. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held in this case that the demand requirement of Rule j 
23.1 does not apply to such actions. Fox v. Reich & Tang, 
Inc., 692 F. 2d 250 (CA2 1982). Two other Courts of Ap-
peals have reached a contrary conclusion. 1 We granted cer-
tiorari to resolve the conflict, --U. S. -- (1983), and now 
affirm. 
I 
Respondent is a shareholder of petitioner Daily Income 
Fund, Inc. ("Fund"), an open-end diversified management in-
vestment company, or "mutual fund," regulated by the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA" or "Act"), 15 U. S. C. 
§ 80a-l et seq. The Fund invests in a portfolio of short-term 
money market instruments with the aim of achieving high 
'Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund, Inc., 692 F. 2d 928 (CA3 1982), 
cert. pending, No. 82-1592; Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F. 2d 115 (CAl), 
cert. denied,- U.S.- (1982). 
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current income while preserving capital. Under a written 
contract, petitioner Reich & Tang, Inc. ("R&T") provides the 
Fund with investment advice and other management services 
in exchange for a fee currently set at one-half of one percent 
of the Fund's net assets. From 1978 to 1981, the Fund ex-
perienced substantial growth; its net assets increased from 
about $75 million to $775 million. During this period, R&T's 
fee of one-half of one percent of net assets remained the 
same. Accordingly, annual payments by the Fund to R&T 
rose from about $375,000 to an estimated $3,875,000 in 1981. 
Alleging that these fees were unreasonable, respondent 
brought this action in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, naming both the Fund 
and R&T as defendants. The complaint alleged that, be-
cause the Fund's assets had been continually reinvested in a 
limited number of instruments, R&T's investment decisions 
had remained routine and substantially unchanged as the 
Fund grew. By receiving significantly higher fees for essen-
tially the same services, R&T had, according to respondent, 
violated the fiduciary duty owed investment companies by 
theiradvisersunder§36(b)oftheiCA. Pub. L. No. 91-547, 
Section 20, 84 Stat. 1428, 15 U.S. C. §80a-35(b). 2 The 
2 Section 36(b) of the ICA provides, in relevant part: 
"For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a regis-
tered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with 
respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a ma-
terial nature, paid by such registered investment company or by the secu-
rity holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of 
such investment adviser. An action may be brought under this subsection 
by the Commission, or by a security holder of such registered investment 
company on behalf of such company, against such investment adviser, or 
any affiliated person of such investment adviser, or any ot.her person enu-
merated in subsection (a) of this section who has a fiduciary duty concern-
ing such compensation or payments, for breach of fiduciary duty in respect 
of such compensation or payments paid by such registered investment com-
pany or by the security holders thereof to such investment adviser or per-
son. " 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35(b). 
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complaint sought damages in favor of the Fund as well as 
payment of respondent's costs, expenses, and attorney's fees. 
Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit for failure to comply 
with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.1, which governs "a derivative 
action brought by one or more shareholders . . . to enforce a 
right of a corporation ... , the corporation . . . having failed 
to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it .... " 
The Rule requires a shareholder bringing such a suit to set 
forth "the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the 
action he desires from the directors . . . , and the reasons for 
his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." 8 
Respondent contended that the Rule 23.1 "demand require-
ment" does not apply to actions brought under § 36(b) of the 
Section 36(b) goes on to provide, inter alia, that proof of a defendant's 
misconduct is unnecessary, § 80a-35(b)(l), that approval by the board of di-
rectors or shareholders of the adviser's compensation "shall be given such 
consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circum-
stances,"§ 80a-35(b)(2), and that recovery is limited to actual damages for 
a period of one year prior to suit, § 80a-35(b)(3). 
3 Rule 23.1 provides in full: 
"In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members 
to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the 
corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may prop-
erly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) 
that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transac-
tion of which he complains or that his share or membership thereafter de-
volved on him by operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive 
one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would 
otherwise not have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the 
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the 
directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders 
or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not 
making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it ap-
pears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the inter-
ests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the 
right of the corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed 
or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the pro-
posed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members 
in such manner as the court directs." 
. . 
82-1200-0PINION 
4 DAILY INCOME FUND, INC. v. FOX 
ICA and that, in any event, demand was excused because the 
Fund's directors had participated in the alleged wrongdoing 
and would be hostile to the suit. The district court, finding 
Rule 23.1 applicable to § 36(b) actions and finding no excuse 
based on the directors' possible self-interest or bias, dis-
missed the action. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 94 
(SDNY 1982). 
The Court of Appeals reversed. Fox v. Reich & Tang, 
Inc., 692 F. 2d 250 (CA2 1982). The court concluded that 
Rule 23.1 by its terms applies only when the corporation 
could itself "'assert,' in a court, the same action under the 
same rule of law on which the shareholder plaintiff relies." 
I d., at 254. Relying on both the language and the legisla-
tive history of § 36(b), the court determined that an invest-
ment company may not itself sue under that section to re-
cover excessive adviser fees. I d., at 254-261. Accordingly, 
the court held that Rule 23.1 does not apply to actions by se-
curity holders brought under § 36(b ). I d., at 261. 
II 
Although any action in which a shareholder asserts the 
rights of a corporation could be characterized as "derivative," 
see n. 11 infra, Rule 23.1 applies in terms only to a "deriva-
tive action brought by one or more shareholders or members 
to enforce a right of a corporation [when] the corporation 
[has] failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted 
by it" (emphasis added). This qualifying language suggests 
that the type of derivative action governed by the Rule is one 
in which a shareholder claims a right that could have been, 
but was not, "asserted" by the corporation in court. The 
"right" mentioned in the emphasized phrase, which cannot 
sensibly mean any right without limitation, is most naturally 
understood as referring to the same right, or at least its sub-
stantial equivalent, as the one asserted by the plaintiff share-
holder. And, in the context of a rule of judicial procedure, 
the reference to the corporation's "failure to enforce a right 
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which may properly be asserted by it" o~ses) LA~ 
that the right in question could be en!Orced by the corpora- l Y 
tion in court. 
This interpretation of the Rule is consistent with the un-
derstanding we have expressed, in a variety of contexts, of 
the term "derivative action." In Hawes v. City of Oakland, 
104 U. S. 450, 460 (1882), for instance, the Court explained 
that a derivative suit is one "founded on a right of action ex-
isting in the corporation itself, and in which the corporation 
itself is the appropriate plaintiff." Similarly, Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 548 (1949), stated that a de-
rivative action allows a stockholder "to step into the corpora-
tion's shoes and to seek in its right the restitution he could 
not demand in his own"; and the Court added that such a 
stockholder "brings suit on a cause of action derived from the 
corporation." Id., at 549. Finally, Ross v. Bernhard, 396 
U. S. 531, 534 (1970), described a derivative action as "a suit 
to enforce a corporate cause of action against officers, direc-
tors, and third parties" (emphasis in original) and viewed the 
question there presented-whether the Seventh Amendment 
confers a right to a jury in such an action-as the same as 
whether the corporation, had it brought the suit itself, would 
be entitled to a jury. ld., at 538-539. In sum, the term 
"derivative action," which defines the scope of Rule 23.1, has 
long been understood to apply only to those actions in which 
the right claimed by the shareholder is one the corporation 
could itself have enforced in court. See also Koster v. Lum-
bermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 522 (1947); 
Price v. Gurney, 324 U. S. 100, 105 (1945); Delaware & Hud-
son R.R. Co. v. Albany & Susquehana R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 
435, 447 (1909). 4 
• One commentator has explained that "the derivative suit may be 
viewed as the consolidation in equity of, on the one hand, a suit by the 
shareholder against the directors in their official capacity, seeking an af-
finnative order that they sue the alleged wrongdoers, and, on the other, a 
suit by the corporation against these wrongdoers." Note, Demand on Di-
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The origin and purposes of Rule 23.1 support this under- ) 
standing of its scope. The Rule's provisions derive from this 
Court's decision in Hawes v. City of Oakland, supra. Prior 
to Hawes, federal courts exercising their equity powers had 
commonly entertained suits by minority stockholders to en-
force corporate rights in circumstances where the corpora-
tion had failed to sue on its own behalf. I d., at 452. See 
Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 339 (1855); 7A C. Wright & 
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1821, at 296-297 
(1972). The Court in Hawes, while emphasizing the impor-
tance of such suits as a means of "protecting the stockholder 
against the frauds of the governing body of directors or trust-
ees," 104 U. S., at 453, noted that this equitable device was 
subject to two kinds of potential abuse. First, corporations 
that were engaged in disputes with citizens of their home 
state could collude with out-of-state stockholders to obtain di-
versity jurisdiction in order to litigate the dispute in the fed-
eral courts. I d., at 452-453. Second, derivative actions 
brought by minority stockholders could, if unconstrained, un-
dermine the basic principle of corporate governance that the 
decisions of a corporation-including the decision to initiate 
litigation-should be made by the board of directors or the 
majority of shareholders. See id., at 454-457. 
To address these problems, the Court in Hawes established 
a number of prerequisites to bringing derivative suits in the 
rectors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 Harv. 
L. Rev. 746, 748 (1960). The Court in Hawes embraced this conception of 
the suit as consolidating "two causes of action," 104 U. S., at 452, andre-
ferred throughout its opinion to a derivative action as "one in which the 
right of action [is] in the company," id., at 455; see id., at 457 (cases impose 
limits on "the right of a stockholder to sue in cases where the corporation is 
the proper party to bring the suit"). See also Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell 
Gold Mining Co., 187 U. S. 455, 463 (1903) (describing rules governing de:. 
rivative suits as limiting situations in which "a court of equity may be 
called upon at the appeal of any single stockholder to compel the directors 
of the corporation to enforce every right which it may possess, irrespective 
of other considerations"); Black's Law Dictionary 1272 (5th ed., 1979). 
' . 
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federal courts. These requirements were designed t~t 
the use of the device to situations in which, due to an unjusti-----.. ~
fied failure of the corporation to act for itself, it was appropri-
ate o perrru a a er o 1~and conduct a litiga-
tion which usually belongs to the corporation." Id., at 460. 
With some additions and changes in wording, the conditions 
set out in Hawes have been carried forward in successive re-
visions of the federal rules. 5 
Some of the requirements first announced in Hawes were 
intended to reduce the burden on the federal courts by di-
verting corporate causes of action "to the State courts, which 
are their natural, their lawful, and their appropriate forum." 
Id., at 452-453. 6 At the same time, however, the Court 
'Shortly after Hawes was decided, the Court codified its requirements 
in Equity Rule 94, which provided: 
"Every bill brought by one or more shareholders in a corporation, 
against the corporation and other parties, founded on rights which may 
properly be asserted by the corporation, must be verified by oath, and 
must contain an allegation that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time 
of the transaction of which he complains, or that his share had devolved on 
him since by operation of law; and that the suit is not a collusive one to 
confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction of a case it would not 
otherwise have cognizance. It must also set forth with particularity the 
efforts of the plaintiff to secure such action as he desires on the part of the 
managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, of the shareholders, and 
the cause of his failure to obtain such action." 104 U. S. IX (1882). 
In 1912, the Court replaced the original rule with Equity Rule 27, identi-
cal to its predecessor except that it added at the very end the phrase "or 
the reasons for not making such effort." This language was apparently 
intended to codify a judicially recognized exception to the old rule in certain 
circumstances where, in the discretion of the court, a demand may be ex-
cused. See Delaware & Hudson R.R. v. Albany & Susquehanna R.R., 
213 u. s. 435 (1909). 
When the federal rules were promulgated in 1937, the provisions of Eq-
uity Rule 27 were substantially restated in Rule 23(b). See 3B J. Moore & 
J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice ~23.1.15[1], at p. 23.1-10 (2d ed. 
1982). Finally, in 1966, the present version of new Rule 23.1 was adopted 
as part of a comprehensive revision of the rules governing class actions. 
See id., ~23 . 1.01, at p. 23.1-3. 
82-12~PINION 
8 DAILY INCOME FUND, INC. v. FOX 
sought to maintain derivative suits as a limited exception to 
the usual rule that the proper party to b~half 
of acorporation is the corporation itself, acting through its 
directors or the majority of its shareholders. ld., at 
460-461. As the Court later explained, this aspect of the 
rules governing derivative suits reflects the basic policy that 
"[ w ]hether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the 
courts a cause of action for damages is, like other business 
questions, ordinarily a matter of internal management and is 
left to the discretion of the directors, in the absence of in-
struction by vote of the stockholders." United Copper Se-
curities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261, 263 
(1917). See also Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining 
Co., 187 U. S. 455, 463 (1903). 7 
6 In particular, the Court required the complaint in a derivative suit to 
allege that the plaintiff "was a shareholder at the time of the transactions 
of which he complains, or that his shares have devolved on him since by 
operation of law, and that the suit is not a collusive one to confer on a court 
of the United States jurisdiction in a case of which it could otherwise have 
no cognizance .... " 104 U. S., at 461. The second of these requirements 
was clearly meant to discourage efforts t6 bring disputes between a com-
pany and citizens of the state of incorporation within the diversity jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts. See supra, at --; 3 B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, 
supra, ~ 23.1.15[1], at p. 23. i-14. Although the first requirement may 
also have been intended to discourage contrived diversity suits, see id., 
~ 23.1.15[1], at p. 23.1-15, it is now understood as generally "aimed at pre-
venting the federal courts from being used to litigate purchased griev-
ances." 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1828, at pp. 341--342 (1972). 
7 Like the requirements adopted in Hawes, the two major features of 
Rule 23.1 added since that decision-the requirement that the plaintiff 
"fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or mem-
bers similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or associa-
tion" and the provision requiring notice and court approval of settle-
ments-are also intended to prevent shareholders from suing in place of 
· the corporation in circumstances where the action would disserve the le-
gitimate interests of the company or its shareholders. See generally 7 A 
C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, §§ 1833 & 1839; 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, 
supra, ~~ 23.1.16[3] & 23.1.24. 
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The principal means by which the Court in Hawes sought 
to vindicate this policy was, of course, its requirement that a 
shareholder seek action by the corporation itself before 
bringing a derivative suit. 104 U. S., at 460-461.8 This 
"demand requirement" affords the directors an opportunity 
to exercise their reasonable business judgment and "waive a 
legal right vested in the corporation in the belief that its best 
interests will be promoted by not insisting on such right. 
They may regard the expense of enforcing the right or the 
furtherance of the general business of the corporation in 
determining whether to waive or insist upon the right." 
Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U. S. 455, 
463 (1903). On the other hand, if, in the view of the direc-
tors, "litigation is appropriate, acceptance of the demand 
places the resources of the corporation, including its informa-
tion, personnel, funds, and counsel, behind the suit." Note, 
I 
The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder De-
rivative Actions, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 168, 171-172 (1976) 
(footnote omitted). Like the Rule in general, therefore, the 
provisions regarding de~awsuit that coUld be 
8 Although the Court in Hawes imposed a direct requirement that share-
holders make demand on directors before bringing suit, 104 U. S., at 
460-461, Rule 23.1 as presently written requires only that a shareholder's 
"complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by 
the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or compara-
ble authority .... "(emphasis added). Relying on the emphasized quali-
fication, added to the Rule without comment by the drafters in 1966, see n. 
4, supra, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), appearing as 
amicus curiae, contends that the Rule does not itself oblige the share-
holder to make a demand; instead, it simply requires the plaintiff to plead 
compliance with applicable obligations of substantive law, ordinarily that of 
the state of incorporation. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 478 (1979). 
Because we conclude that a suit brought under § 36(b) of the Investment 
Company Act is not a "derivative action" for purposes of Rule 23.1, see 
infra, at --, we need not decide whether the Rule itself, as a matter of 
federal procedure, makes demand on directors the predicate to a proper 
derivative suit in federal courts or whether any such obligation must in-
stead be found in applicable substantive law. 
' . 
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controlled by the cor oration's board of directors. 9 ~ 
~~- s~, the conceptual basis and purposes of Rule 23.1 con-
firm what its language suggests: the Rule governs only suits 
"to enforce a right of a corporation" when the corporation it-
self has "failed to enforce a right which may properly be as-
serted by it" in court. In this case, therefore, we must de-
cide whether the right asserted by a hareho suing under 
§ 36(6)0[fhe nvestment Company Act co~ en-
forced by the investment company. 10 We turn to consider 
that q 
9 Petitioners point out that, even in cases where the corporation could 
not control the shareholder's lawsuit, a demand on directors affords man-
agement an opportunity to pursue non-judicial remedies for the sharehold-
er's grievance. But however desirable the encouragement of intra-
corporate remedies may be as a matter of policy, it is not, standing alone, 
enough to make a suit that the corporation can neither initiate nor termi-
nate a "derivative action" within the meaning of Rule 23.1. Such a suit 
does not come within the Rule's language as it is most naturally interpreted 
and as we have consistently understood it. See supra, at --. More-
over, the Rule and its predecessors were directed at ensuring that the 
proper party was before the court in a certain class of cases, see supra, at 
--, and a shareholder action that the corporation cannot control raises no 
proper party concerns. 
'"Petitioners contend that, even if an investment company could not 
bring a suit under § 36(b), a shareholder's action under that section is nev-
ertheless derivative for purposes of Rule 23.1 because the investment com-
pany has a similar right to" recover excessive fees from its investment ad-
viser under a state law cause of action for corporate waste. See, e. g., 
Llewellyn v. Queen City Dairy, Inc., 48 A. 2d 322, 326 (Md. 1946). The 
fact that the corporation may be able to achieve some of the results con-
templated by§ 36(b) under state law does not, however, demonstrate that 
a shareholder's action brought under an independent federal statute claims 
"a right which may properly be asserted" by the corporation. See supra, 
at --. The new right created by § 36(b) is not only formally distinct 
from that asserted in a state claim of corporate waste; it is substantively 
different as well. Indeed, an important reason for the enactment of§ 36(b) 
was Congress's belief that the standards applied in corporate waste actions 
were inadequate to ensure reasonable adviser fees. As the Senate Com-
mittee that reported the bill that became § 36(b) explained: 
. . 
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III 
In determining whether § 36(b) confers a right that could 
be judicially enforced by an investment company, we look 
first, of course, at the language of the statute. As noted 
above, supra at -- and n. 1, § 36(b) imposes a fiduciary 
duty on an investment company's aaviser "with respect to 
the receipt of compensation for services" paid by the com-
pany and provides that "[a]n action may be brought under 
this subsection by the [Secun 1es an xc an e o mis-
sion,~ y a secur1 y o er of sue registered investment 
company 0~company" against the adviser and 
other affiliated parties. By its terms, then, the unusual 
cause of action created by § 36(b) differs significantly from 
those traditionally asserted in shareholder derivative suits. 
Instead of establishin a corporate action from which a share-
hoi er ng to sue erivatlve y may e inferred, § 36(b) ex-
pressly provides that the new cor orate right it crea't'e'S'ffiay 
be by the ecuri 1es and xchange 
C) and security ho ders of the company. 11 -----Under general rules of law, advisory contracts which are ratified by the 
shareholders, or in some States approved by a vote of the disinterested di-
rectors, may not be upset in the courts except upon a showing of "corpo-
rate waste." As one court put it, the fee must "Shock the conscience of 
the court." Such a rule may not be an improper one when the protections 
of arm's-length bargaining are present. But in the mutual fund industry 
where[] these marketplace forces are not likely to operate as effectively, 
your committee has decided that the standard of "corporate waste" is un-
duly restrictive and recommends that it be changed." S. Rep. No. 91-184, 
p. 5 (1970) 
See infra, at -- and n. 12. 
11 Petitioners argue that, because § 36(b) provides for an action "by a se-
curity holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such 
company" (emphasis added), such an action is necessarily derivative. In 
this regard, petitioners rely on this Court's statement in Burks v. Lasker, 
441 U. S. 471, 477 (1979) that a "derivative suit is brought by shareholders 
to enforce a claim on behalf of the corporation" (emphasis added). See also 
id., at 484 (referring to actions brought under § 36(b) as "derivative"). 
The "on behalf" language indicates, however, only that the right asserted 
12 DAILY INCOME FUND, INC. v. FOX 
Petitioners ne hele s contend that an investment com-
pany has a implied ri ht of action nder § 36(b). In evaluat-
ing such a claim, our focus must be on the ~ss 
when it enacted the statute in question. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 377-378 
(1982). That intent may in turn be discerned by examining a 
number oflactors, including the ~ and pur-
poses of the statute, the identity of tlie class for whosepar-----------ticular benefit the statute was passed, and the traditional 
role of the states in affording the relief claimed. Ibid.; Cali-
fornia v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 292-293 (1981); Cannon 
v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 
422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975). In this case, consideration of each of 
these factors plainly demonstrates that Congress intended 
the unique right created by § 36(b) to be enforced solely by 
the SEC and security holders of the investment company. 
As we have previously noted, Congress adopted the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 because of its concern with 
"the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of invest-
ment companies." Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 480 
(1979). Unlike most corporations, an investment company is 
typically created and managed by a pre-existing external 
organization known as an investment adviser. I d., at 481. 
by a shareholder suing under§ 36(b) is a "right of the corporation"-a prop-
osition confirmed by other aspects of the action: The fiduciary duty im-
posed on advisers by § 36(b) is owed to the company itself as well as its 
shareholders and any recovery obtained in a § 36(b) action will go to the 
company rather than the plaintiff. See S. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 6 (1970); 
§ 36(b)(3). In this respect, a § 36(b) action is undeniably "derivative" in 
the broad sense of that word. See supra, at - . As we have noted, 
however, Rule 23.1 applies by its terms only to "a derivative action 
brought by one or more shareholders . . . to enforce a right of a corporation 
[when] the corporation [has] failed to enforce a right which may properly 
be asserted by it" (emphasis added). Ibid. The legislative history of 
§ 36(b) makes clear that Congress intended the perhaps unique "right of a 
corporation" established by § 36(b) to be asserted by the company's secu-
rity holders and not by the company itself. Infra, at - . 
. . 
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Because the adviser generally supervises the daily operation 
of the fund and often selects affiliated persons to serve on the 
company's board of directors, the "relationship between in-
vestment advisers and mutual funds is fraught with potential 
conflicts of interest." Ibid., quoting Galfand v. Chestnutt 
Corp., 545 F. 2d 807, 808 (CA2 1976). In order to minimize 
such conflicts of interests, Congress established a scheme 
that regulates most transactions between investment compa-
nies and their advisers, 15 U. S. C. §80a-17; limits the num-
ber of persons affiliated with the adviser who may serve on 
the fund's board of directors, § 80a-10; and requires that fees 
for investment advice and other services be governed by a 
written contract approved both by the directors and the 
shareholders of the fund, § 80a-15. 
In the years following passage of the Act, investment com-
panies enjoyed enormous growth, prompting a number of 
studies of the effectiveness of the Act in protecting investors. 
One such report, commissioned by the SEC, found that in-
vestment advisers often charged mutual funds higher fees 
than those charged the advisers' other clients and further de-
termined that the structure of the industry, even as regu-
lated by the Act, had proven resistant to efforts to moderate 
adviser compensation. Wharton School Study of Mutual 
Funds, H. R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 
28-30, 34, 6&-67 (1962). Specifically, the study concluded 
that the unaffiliated directors mandated by the Act were "of 
restricted value as an instrument for providing effective 
representation of mutual fund shareholders in dealings be-
tween the fund and its investment adviser." Id., at 34. A 
subsequent report, authored by the SEC itself, noted that in-
vestment advisers were generally compensated on the basis 
of a fixed percentage of the fund's assets, rather than on 
services rendered or actual expenses. Securities & Ex-
change Commission, Public Policy Implications of Invest-
ment Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 89-2337, p. 89 (1966) 
(hereinafter SEC Report). The Commission determined 
' . 
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that, as a fund's assets grew, this form of payment could 
produce unreasonable fees in light of the economies of scale 
realized in managing a larger portfolio. Id., at 94, 102. 
Furthermore, the Commission concluded that lawsuits by se-
curity holders challenging the reasonableness of adviser fees 
had been largely ineffective due to the standards employed 
by courts to judge the fees. Id., at 132-143. See infra, at 
--and n. 12. 
In order to remedy this and other perceived inadequacies 
in the Act, the SEC submitted a series of legislative propos-
als to Congress that led to the 1970 Amendments to the Act. 
Some of the proposals Congress ultimately adopted were in-
tended to make the fund's board of directors more independ-
ent of the adviser and to encourage greater scrutiny of ad-
viser contracts. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §80a-10(a) 
(requiring that at least 40% of the directors not be "inter-
ested persons," a broader category than the previously iden-
tified group of persons "affiliated" with the adviser, see 
§ 80a-2(a)(19)); § 80a-15(c) (requiring · independent directors 
as well as shareholders to approve adviser contracts); Burks 
v. Lasker, supra, 441 U. S., at 482-483. The SEC had, 
however, determined that approval of adviser contracts by 
shareholders and independent directors could not alone pro-
vide complete protection of the interests of security holders 
with respect to adviser compensation. See SEC Report, 
supra, at p. 128-131, 144, 146-147. Accordingly, the Com-
mission also proposed amending the Act to require "reason-
able" fees. I d., at 143-147. As initially considered by Con-
gress, the bill containing this proposal would have 
empowered the SEC to bring actions to enforce the reason-
ableness standard and to intervene in any similar action 
brought by or on behalf of the company. H. R. 9510, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1967); S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 8(d) (1967). 
Representatives of the investment company industry, led 
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concern that enabling the SEC to enforce the fairness of ad-
viser fees might in essence provide the Commission with 
rate-making authority. Accordingly, ICI proposed an alter-
native to the SEC bill which would have provided that ac-
tions to enforce the reasonableness standard "be brought 
only by the company or a security holder thereof on its be-
half." Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967: Hearings on S. 1659 
Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, at pp. 100-101 (1967) (hereinafter ) 
1967 Hearings). The version that the Senate finally passed, 
however, rejected the industry's suggestion that the invest-
ment compa 1 e e ex ress y au o 1ze to brmg suit. 
s~ 3724, ong., ess. nsteatl, the 
Senate bill required a security holder to make demand on the 
SEC before bringing suit and provided that, if the Commis-
sion refused or failed to bring an action within six months, 
the security holder could maintain a suit against the adviser 
in a "derivative" or representative capacity. !bid. Like the 
original SEC proposal, however, the Senate bill provided 
that the SEC could intervene in any action brought by the 
company or by a security holder on its behalf. I d., § 22. 
After the bill was reintroduced in the 91st Congress, fur-
ther hearings and consultations with the industry led to the 
present version of§ 36(b). See S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 20(b) (1969); 115 Cong. Rec. 13648 (1969) (Statement of Sen. 
Mcintyre). The new version adopted "a different method of 
testing management compensation." S. Rep. No. 91-184, at 
p. 5 (1969). Instead of containing a statutory standard of 
"reasonableness," the new version imposed a "fiduciary duty'' 
on investment advisers. I d., at pp. 5-6. The new bill fur-
ther provided that "either the SEC or a shareholder may sue 
in court on a complaint that a mutual fund's management fees 
involve a breach of fiduciary duty." I d., at 7. The refer-
ence in the previous bill to the derivative or representative 
nature of the security holder action was eliminated, as was 
the earlier provision for intervention by the SEC in actions 
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brought by the investment company itself. See S. 2224, 
supra, §22. 
In short, Congress rejected a ro osal that would have ex- \ 
pressly made t e statutory stan ard overnin adviser fees 
enforcea e y e mvestmen company Itself and a opted in 
its place a provision containing none of the indications in ear-
lier drafts that the company could bring such a suit. This 
legislative history strongly suggests that, in adopting§ 36(b), 
Congress did not intend to create an implied right of action in 
favor of the investment company. 
That conclusion is further supported by the purposes of the 
statute. As noted above, the SEC proposed the predecessor 
to § 36(b) because of its concern that the structural require-
ments for investment companies imposed by the Act would 
not alone ensure reasonable adviser fees. See supra, at 
--. Indeed, the Commission concluded that the Act's pro-
visions for independent directors and approval of adviser con-
tracts had actually frustrated effective challenges to adviser 
fees. In particular,· the Commission noted tfiat in the three 
fully litigated cases in which security holders had attacked 
such fees under state law, the courts had relied on the ap-
proval of adviser contracts by security holders or unaffiliated 
directors to uphold the fees. SEC Report, supra, at p. 
132-143. 12 For this reason, the Senate Report proposing the 
final version of the statute noted that, while shareholder and 
directorial approval of the adviser's contract are entitled to 
12 In the three cases cited by the SEC, the courts had evaluated the ad-
viser contracts according to common law standards of corporate waste, 
under which an unreasonable or unfair fee might be approved unless the 
court deemed it "unconscionable" or "shocking." SEC Report, supra, at 
142. See Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F . Supp. 527, 548-549 (D. Colo. 
1963); Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A. 2d 602, 610 (1962); 
Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A. 2d 720, 723 (1961). Simi-
larly, security holders challenging adviser fees under the Investment Com-
pany Act itself had been required to prove gross abuse of trust. See 
Brown v. Bullock , 194 F . Supp. 207 (SDNY 1961), aff'd, 294 F. 2d 415 
(CA2 1961). See 1967 Hearings, supra, at 117-118. 
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serious consideration by the court in a § 36(b) action, "such 
consideration would not be controlling in determining 
whether or not the fee encompassed a breach of fiduciary 
duty." S. Rep. No. 91-184, at p. 15 (1969); see id., at p. 5. 
In contrast to its approach in other aspects of the 1970 
amendments, then, Congress decided not to rely solely on the 
fund's directors to assure reasonable adviser fees, notwith-
standing the increased disinterestedness of the board. See 
Burks v. Lasker, supra, 441 U. S., at 481-482 n. 10 and 484. 
See also SEC Report, supra, at 146-148 (right of SEC and 
security holders to bring actions essential; although role of 
disinterested directors should be enhanced, "even a require-
ment that all of the directors of an externally managed in-
vestment company be persons unaffiliated with the compa-
ny's adviser-underwriter would not be an effective check on 
advisory fees and other forms of management compensa-
tion"). This policy choice strongly indicates that Congress 
intended security holder and SEC actions under § 36(b), on 
the one hand, and directorial approval of adviser contracts, 
on the other, to act as independent checks on excessive fees. 
Nor do other factors on which we have relied to identify an 
implie cause of action sup~ petitioners ~~im that the 
right asserted by a shareholder in a§ 36(b) action could be en-
forced by the investment company. First, investment com-
panies, as well as the investing public, are undoubtedly 
within "the class for whose especial benefit" § 36(b) was en-
acted, Cart v. Ash, supra, 422 U. S., at 78 (emphasis in origi-
nal), seen. 11, supra. Section§ 36(b)'s express provision for 
actions by security holders, owever, ensures t at, even if l 
tfie com 1rectors cannot bring an action in the fund's 
name, the com any's rights under the statut~~ly 
vindicated by plainti s au or1ze to act on its behalf. For 
this reason, 1 IS unnecessary to infer a right o action in favor 
of the corporation in order to serve the statute's "broad re-
medial purpose." Cf., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 
-- U. S. --, -- (1983). See also Middlesex County 
' . 
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Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 
U. S. 1, 13, 15 (1981). Second, because § 36(b) creates an en-
tirely new right, it was obviously not enacted "in a statutory 
context in which an implied private remedy [had] already 
been recognized by the courts." Cf., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith v. Curran, supra, 456 U. S., at 378; Her-
man & MacLean v. Huddleston, supra, at--. Third, a 
corporation's rights against its directors or third parties with 
whom it has contracted are generally governed by state, not 
federal, law. Burks v. Lasker, supra, 441 U. S., at 478. 
See C ort v. Ash, supra, 422 U. S., at 78. 
IV 
A shareholder derivative action is an exception to the nor-
mal rule that the proper party to bring a suit on behalf of a 
corporation is the corporation itself, acting through its direc-
tors or a majority of its shareholders. Accordingly, Rule 
23.1, which establishes procedures designed to prevent mi-
nority shareholders from abusing this equitable device, is ad-
dressed only to situations in which shareholders seek to en-
force a right that "may properly be asserted" by the 
corporation itself. In contrast, as the language of § 36(b) in-
dicates, Congress intended the fiduciary duty imposed on in-
vestment advisers by that statute to be enforced solely by se-
curity holders of the investment company and the SEC. It 
would be anomalous, therefore, to apply a Rule intended to 
prevent a shareholder from improperly suing in place of the 
corporation to a statute, like § 36(b), conferring a right which 
the corporation itself cannot enforce. It follows that Rule 
23.1 does not apply to an action brought by a shareholder 
under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act and that the 
plaintiff in such a case need not first make a demand upon the 
fund's directors before bringing suit. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore 
Affirmed. 
•-------· 
December 30, 1983 
82-1200 Daily Income Fund v. Fox 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-1200 
DAILY INCOME FUND, INC. AND REICH & TANG, 
INC., PETITIONERS v. MARTIN FOX 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1984] 
JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question for decision is whether Rule 23.1 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an investment 
company security holder first make a demand upon the com-
pany's board of directors before bringing an action under 
§ 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA or Act) 
to recover allegedly excessive fees paid by the company to its 
investment adviser. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held in this case that the demand requirement of Rule 
23.1 does not apply to such actions. Fox v. Reich & Tang, 
Inc., 692 F. 2d 250 (CA2 1982). Two other Courts of Ap-
peals have reached a contrary conclusion. 1 We granted cer-
tiorari to resolve the conflict,-- U. S. -- (1983), and now 
affirm. 
I 
Respondent is a shareholder of petitioner Daily Income 
Fund, Inc. ("Fund"), an open-end diversified management in-
vestment company, or "mutual fund," regulated by the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA" or "Act"), 15 U. S. C. 
§80a-1 et seq. The Fund invests in a portfolio of short-term 
money market instruments with the aim of achieving high 
1 Weiss v. Temporary Investment Fund, Inc. , 692 F. 2d 928 (CA3 1982), 
cert. pending, No. 82-1592; Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F. 2d 115 (CAl), 
cert. denied,- U.S.- (1982). 
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current income while preserving capital. Under a written 
contract, petitioner Reich & Tang, Inc. ("R&T") provides the 
Fund with investment advice and other management services 
in exchange for a fee currently set at one-half of one percent 
of the Fund's net assets. From 1978 to 1981, the Fund ex-
perienced substantial growth; its net assets increased from 
about $75 million to $775 million. During this period, R&T's 
fee of one-half of one percent of net assets remained the 
same. Accordingly, annual payments by the Fund to R&T 
rose from about $375,000 to an estimated $3,875,000 in 1981. 
Alleging that these fees were unreasonable, respondent 
brought this action in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, naming both the Fund 
and R&T as defendants. The complaint alleged that, be-
cause the Fund's assets had been continually reinvested in a 
limited number of instruments, R&T's investment decisions 
had remained routine and substantially unchanged as the 
Fund grew. By receiving significantly higher fees for essen-
tially the same services, R&T had, according to respondent, 
violated the fiduciary duty owed investment companies by 
their advisers under§ 36(b) of the ICA. Pub. L. No. 91-547, 
Section 20, 84 Stat. 1428, 15 U. S. C. §80a--35(b). 2 The 
2 Section 36(b) of the ICA provides, in relevant part: 
"For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a regis-
tered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with 
respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a ma-
terial nature, paid by such registered investment company or by the secu-
rity holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of 
such investment adviser. An action may be brought under this subsection 
by the Commission, or by a security holder of such registered investment 
company on behalf of such company, against such investment adviser, or 
any affiliated person of such investment adviser, or any other person enu-
merated in subsection (a) of this section who has a fiduciary duty concern-
ing such compensation or payments, for breach of fiduciary duty in respect 
of such compensation or payments paid by such registered investment com-
pany or by the security holders thereof to such investment adviser or per-
son." 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35(b). 
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complaint sought damages in favor of the Fund as well as 
payment of respondent's costs, expenses, and attorney's fees. 
Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit for failure to comply 
with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23.1, which governs "a derivative 
action brought by one or more shareholders . . . to enforce a 
right of a corporation ... , the corporation ... having failed 
to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it. . . . " 
The Rule requires a shareholder bringing such a suit to set 
forth "the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the 
action he desires from the directors . . . , and the reasons for 
his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." 8 
Respondent contended that the Rule 23.1 "demand require-
ment" does not apply to actions brought under § 36(b) of the 
Section 36(b) goes on to provide, inter alia, that proof of a defendant's 
misconduct is unnecessary, § 80a-35(b)(1), that approval by the board of di-
rectors or shareholders of the adviser's compensation "shall be given such 
consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circum-
stances,"§ 80a-35(b)(2), and that recovery is limited to actual damages for 
a period of one year prior to suit, § 80a-35(b)(3). 
3 Rule 23.1 provides in full: 
"In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members 
to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the 
corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may prop-
erly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) 
that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transac-
tion of which he complains or that his share or membership thereafter de-
volved on him by operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive 
one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would 
otherwise not have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the 
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the 
directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders 
or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not 
making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it ap-
pears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the inter-
ests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the 
right of the corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed 
or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the pro-
posed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members 
in such manner as the court directs." 
----
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ICA and that, in any event, demand was excused because the 
Fund's directors had participated in the alleged wrongdoing 
and would be hostile to the suit. The district court, finding 
Rule 23.1 applicable to § 36(b) actions and finding no excuse 
based on the directors' possible self-interest or bias, dis-
missed the action. Fox v. Reich & Tang, Inc., 94 F. R. D. 
94 (SDNY 1982). 
The Court of Appeals reversed. Fox v. Reich & Tang, 
Inc., 692 F. 2d 250 (CA2 1982). The court concluded that 
Rule 23.1 by its terms applies only when the corporation 
could itself "'assert,' in a court, the same action under the 
same rule of law on which the shareholder plaintiff relies." 
I d., at 254. Relying on both the language and the legislative 
history of § 36(b), the court determined that an investment 
company may not itself sue under that section to recover ex-
cessive adviser fees. !d., at 254-261. Accordingly, the 
court held that Rule 23.1 does not apply to actions by security 
holders brought under § 36(b). I d., at 261. 
II 
Although any action in which a shareholder asserts the 
rights of a corporation could be characterized as "derivative," 
seen. 11 infra, Rule 23.1 applies in terms only to a "deriva-
tive action brought by one or more shareholders or members 
to enforce a right of a corporation [when] the corporation 
[has]failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted 
by it" (emphasis added). This qualifying language suggests 
that the type of derivative action governed by the Rule is one 
in which a shareholder claims a right that could have been, 
but was not, "asserted" by the corporation in court. The 
"right" mentioned in the emphasized phrase, which cannot 
sensibly mean any right without limitation, is most naturally 
understood as referring to the same right, or at least its sub-
stantial equivalent, as the one asserted by the plaintiff share-
holder. And, in the context of a rule of judicial procedure, 
the reference to the corporation's "failure to enforce a right 
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which may properly be asserted by it" obviously presupposes 
that the right in question could be enforced by the corpora-
tion in court. 
This interpretation of the Rule is consistent with the un-
derstanding we have expressed, in a variety of contexts, of 
the term "derivative action." In Hawes v. City of Oakland, 
104 U. S. 450, 460 (1882), for instance, the Court explained 
that a derivative suit is one "founded on a right of action ex-
isting in the corporation itself, and in which the corporation 
itself is the appropriate plaintiff." Similarly, Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 548 (1949), stated that a de-
rivative action allows a stockholder "to step into the corpora-
tion's shoes and to seek in its right the restitution he could 
not demand in his own"; and the Court added that such a 
stockholder "brings suit on a cause of action derived from the 
corporation." Id., at 549. Finally, Ross v. Bernhard, 396 
U. S. 531, 534 (1970), described a derivative action as "a suit 
to enforce a corporate cause of action against officers, direc-
tors, and third parties" (emphasis in original) and viewed the 
question there presented-whether the Seventh Amendment 
confers a right to a jury in such an action-as the same as 
whether the corporation, had it brought the suit itself, would 
be entitled to a jury. Id., at 538-539. In sum, the term 
"derivative action," which defines the scope of Rule 23.1, has 
long been understood to apply only to those actions in which 
the right claimed by the shareholder is one the corporation 
could itself have enforced in court. See also Koster v. Lum-
bermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518, 522 (1947); 
Price v. Gurney, 324 U. S. 100, 105 (1945); Delaware & Hud-
son R. Co. v. Albany & Susquehana R. Co., 213 U. S. 435, 
447 (1909). 4 
'One commentator has explained that "the derivative suit may be 
viewed as the consolidation in equity of, on the one hand, a suit by the 
shareholder against the directors in their official capacity, seeking an af-
firmative order that they sue the alleged wrongdoers, and, on the other, a 
suit by the corporation against these wrongdoers." Note, Demand on Di-
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The origin and purposes of Rule 23.1 support this under-
standing of its scope. The Rule's provisions derive from this 
Court's decision in Hawes v. City of Oakland, supra. Prior 
to Hawes, federal courts exercising their equity powers had 
commonly entertained suits by minority stockholders to en-
force corporate rights in circumstances where the corpora-
tion had failed to sue on its own behalf. I d., at 452. See 
Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331, 339 (1855); 7A C. Wright & 
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1821, at 296-297 
(1972). The Court in Hawes, while emphasizing the impor-
tance of such suits as a means of "protecting the stockholder 
against the frauds of the governing body of directors .or trust-
ees," 104 U. S., at 453, noted that this equitable device was 
subject to two kinds of potential abuse. First, corporations 
that were engaged in disputes with citizens of their home 
state could collude with out-of-state stockholders to obtain di-
versity jurisdiction in order to litigate the dispute in the fed-
eral courts. I d., at 452-453. Second, derivative actions 
brought by minority stockholders could, if unconstrained, un-
dermine the basic principle of corporate governance that the 
decisions of a corporation-including the decision to initiate 
litigation-should be made by the board of directors or the 
majority of shareholders. See id., at 454--457. 
To address these problems, the Court in Hawes established 
a number of prerequisites to bringing derivative suits in the 
rectors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 Harv. 
L. Rev. 746, 748 (1960). The Court in Hawes embraced this conception of 
the suit as consolidating "two causes of action," 104 U. S., at 452, andre-
ferred throughout its opinion to a derivative action as "one in which the 
right of action [is] in the company," id., at 455; see id., at 457 (cases impose 
limits on "the right of a stockholder to sue in cases where the corporation is 
the proper party to bring the suit"). See also Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell 
Gold Mining Co., 187 U. S. 455, 463 (1903) (describing rules governing de-
rivative suits as limiting situations in which "a court of equity may be 
called upon at the appeal of any single stockholder to compel the directors 
of the corporation to enforce every right which it may possess, irrespective 
of other considerations"); Black's Law Dictionary 1272 (5th ed. , 1979). 
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federal courts. These requirements were designed to limit 
the use of the device to situations in which, due to an unjusti-
fied failure of the corporation to act for itself, it was appropri-
ate to permit a shareholder "to institute and conduct a litiga-
tion which usually belongs to the corporation." I d., at 460. 
With some additions and changes in wording, the conditions 
set out in Hawes have been carried forward in successive re-
visions of the federal rules. 5 
Some of the requirements first announced in Hawes were 
intended to reduce the burden on the federal courts by di-
verting corporate causes of action "to the State courts, which 
are their natural, their lawful, and their appropriate forum." 
Id., at 452-453.6 At the same time, however, the Court 
5 Shortly after Hawes was decided, the Court codified its requirements 
in Equity Rule 94, which provided: 
"Every bill brought by one or more shareholders in a corporation, 
against the corporation and other parties, founded on rights which may 
properly be asserted by the corporation, must be verified by oath, and 
must contain an allegation that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time 
of the transaction of which he complains, or that his share had devolved on 
him since by operation of law; and that 'the suit is not a collusive one to 
confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction of a case it would not 
otherwise have cognizance. It must also set forth with particularity the 
efforts of the plaintiff to secure such action as he desires on the part of the 
managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, of the shareholders, and 
the cause of his failure to obtain such action." 104 U. S. IX (1882). 
In 1912, the Court replaced the original rule with Equity Rule 27, identi-
cal to its predecessor except that it added at the very end the phrase "or 
the reasons for not making such effort." This language was apparently 
intended to codify a judicially recognized exception to the old rule in certain 
circumstances where, in the discretion of the court, a demand may be ex-
cused. See Delaware & Hudson R. Co. v. Albany & Susquehanna R. 
Co., 213 U. S. 435 (1909). 
When the federal rules were promulgated in 1937, the provisions of Eq-
uity Rule 27 were substantially restated in Rule 23(b). See 3B J. Moore & 
J. Kennedy, Moore's Federal Practice ~23.1.15[1], at p. 23.1-10 (2d ed. 
1982). Finally, in 1966, the present version of new Rule 23.1 was adopted 
as part of a comprehensive revision of the rules governing class actions. 
See id. , ~23 . 1.01 , at p. 23.1-3. 
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sought to maintain derivative suits as a limited exception to 
the usual rule that the proper party to bring a claim on behalf 
of a corporation is the corporation itself, acting through its 
directors or the majority of its shareholders. I d., at 
460-461. As the Court later explained, this aspect of the 
rules governing derivative suits reflects the basic policy that 
"[ w ]hether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the 
courts a cause of action for damages is, like other business 
questions, ordinarily a matter of internal management and is 
left to the discretion of the directors, in the absence of in-
struction by vote of the stockholders." United Copper Se-
curities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261, 263 
(1917). See also Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining 
Co., 187 U. S. 455, 463 (1903). 7 
6 In particular, the Court required the complaint in a derivative suit to 
allege that the plaintiff "was a shareholder at the time of the transactions 
of which he complains, or that his shares have devolved on him since by 
operation of law, and that the suit is not a collusive one to confer on a court 
of the United States jurisdiction in a case of which it could otherwise have 
no cognizance .... " 104 U. S., at 461. The second of these requirements 
was clearly meant to discourage efforts to bring disputes between a com-
pany and citizens of the state of incorporation within the diversity jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts. See supra, at 6; 3 B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, 
supra, U3.1.15[1], at p. 23.1-14. Although the first requirement may 
also have been intended to discourage contrived diversity suits, see id., 
~ 23.1.15[1], at p. 23.1-15, it is now understood as generally "aimed at pre-
venting the federal courts from being used to litigate purchased griev-
ances." 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 1828, at pp. 341-342 (1972). 
7 Like the requirements adopted in Hawes, the two major features of 
Rule 23.1 added since that decision-the requirement that the plaintiff 
"fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or mem-
bers similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or associa-
tion" and the provision requiring notice and court approval of settle-
ments-are also intended to prevent shareholders from suing in place of 
the corporation in circumstances where the action would disserve the le-
gitimate interests of the company or its shareholders. See generally 7A 
C. Wright & A. Miller, supra,§§ 1833 & 1839; 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, 
supra, ~~ 23.1.16[3] & 23.1.24. 
,. 
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The principal means by which the Court in Hawes sought 
to vindicate this policy was, of course, its requirement that a 
shareholder seek action by the corporation itself before 
bringing a derivative suit. 104 U. S., at 460-461.8 This 
"demand requirement" affords the directors an opportunity 
to exercise their reasonable business judgment and "waive a 
legal right vested in the corporation in the belief that its best 
interests will be promoted by not insisting on such right. 
They may regard the expense of enforcing the right or the 
furtherance of the general business of the corporation in 
determining whether to waive or insist upon the right." 
Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U. S. 455, 
463 (1903). On the other hand, if, in the view of the direc-
tors, "litigation is appropriate, acceptance of the demand 
places the resources of the corporation, including its informa-
tion, personnel, funds, and counsel, behind the suit." Note, 
The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder De-
rivative Actions, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 168, 171-172 (1976) 
(footnote omitted). Like the Rule in general, therefore, the 
provisions regarding demand assume a lawsuit that could be 
8 Although the Court in Hawes imposed a direct requirement that share-
holders make demand on directors before bringing suit, 104 U. S., at 
460-461, Rule 23.1 as presently written requires only that a shareholder's 
"complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by 
the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or compara-
ble authority .... "(emphasis added). Relying on the emphasized quali-
fication, added to the Rule without comment by the drafters in 1966, see n. 
4, supra, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), appearing as 
amicus curiae, contends that the Rule does not itself oblige the share-
holder to make a demand; instead, it simply requires the plaintiff to plead 
compliance with applicable obligations of substantive law, ordinarily that of 
the state of incorporation. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 478 (1979). 
Because we conclude that a suit brought under § 36(b) of the Investment 
Company Act is not a "derivative action" for purposes of Rule 23.1, see 
irifra, at 18, we need not decide whether the Rule itself, as a matter of 
federal procedure, makes demand on directors the predicate to a proper 
derivative suit in federal courts or whether any such obligation must in-
stead be found in applicable substantive law. 
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controlled by the corporation's board of directors. 9 
In sum, the conceptual basis and purposes of Rule 23.1 con-
firm what its language suggests: the Rule governs only suits 
"to enforce a right of a corporation" when the corporation it-
self has "failed to enforce a right which may properly be as-
serted by it" in court. In this case, therefore, we must de-
cide whether the right asserted by a shareholder suing under 
§ 36(b) of the Investment Company Act could be judicially en-
forced by the investment company. 10 We turn to consider 
that question. 
9 Petitioners point out that, even in cases where the corporation could 
not control the shareholder's lawsuit, a demand on directors affords man-
agement an opportunity to pursue non-judicial remedies for the sharehold-
er's grievance. But however desirable the encouragement of intra-
corporate remedies may be as a matter of policy, it is not, standing alone, 
enough to make a suit that the corporation can neither initiate nor termi-
nate a "derivative action" within the meaning of Rule 23.1. Such a suit 
does not come within the Rule's language as it is most naturally interpreted 
and as we have consistently understood it. See supra, at 4-5. Moreover, 
the Rule and its predecessors were directed at ensuring that the proper 
party was before the court in a certain class of cases, see supra, at ~10, 
and a shareholder action that the corporation cannot control raises no 
proper party concerns. 
10 Petitioners contend that, even if an investment company could not 
bring a suit under § 36(b), a shareholder's action under that section is nev-
ertheless derivative for purposes of Rule 23.1 because the investment com-
pany has a similar right to recover excessive fees from its investment ad-
viser under a state law cause of action for corporate waste. See, e. g., 
Llewellyn v. Queen City Dairy, Inc., 48 A. 2d 322, 326 (Md. 1946). The 
fact that the corporation may be able to achieve some of the results con-
templated by§ 36(b) under state law does not, however, demonstrate that 
a shareholder's action brought under an independent federal statute claims 
"a right which may properly be asserted" by the corporation. See supra, 
at 4-5. The new right created by § 36(b) is not only formally distinct from 
that asserted in a state claim of corporate waste; it is substantively differ-
ent as well. Indeed, an important reason for the enactment of§ 36(b) was 
Congress's belief that the standards applied in corporate waste actions 
were inadequate to ensure reasonable adviser fees. As the Senate Com-
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III 
In determining whether § 36(b) confers a right that could 
be judicially enforced by an investment company, we look 
first, of course, at the language of the statute. As noted 
above, supra at 2 and n. 2, § 36(b) imposes a fiduciary duty on 
an investment company's adviser "with respect to the receipt 
of compensation for services" paid by the company and pro-
vides that "[a]n action may be brought under this subsection 
by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, or by a secu-
rity holder of such registered investment company on behalf 
of such company'' against the adviser and other affiliated par-
ties. By its terms, then, the unusual cause of action created 
by § 36(b) differs significantly from those traditionally as-
serted in shareholder derivative suits. Instead of establish-
ing a corporate action from which a shareholder's right to sue 
derivatively may be inferred, § 36(b) expressly provides only 
that the new corporate right it creates may be enforced by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and security 
holders of the company. 11 
"Under general rules of law, advisory contracts which are ratified by the 
shareholders, or in some States approved by a vote of the disinterested di-
rectors, may not be upset in the courts except upon a showing of 'corporate 
waste.' As one court put it, the fee must 'Shock the conscience of the 
court.' Such a rule may not be an improper one when the protections of 
arm's-length bargaining are present. But in the mutual fund industry 
where[] these marketplace forces are not likely to operate as effectively, 
your committee has decided that the standard of 'corporate waste' is un-
duly restrictive and recommends that it be changed." S. Rep. No. 91-184, 
p. 5 (1970). 
See irifra, at 16 and n. 12. 
11 Petitioners argue that, because § 36(b) provides for an action "by a se-
curity holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such 
company" (emphasis added), such an action is necessarily derivative. In 
this regard, petitioners rely on this Court's statement in Burks v. Lasker, 
441 U. S. 471, 477 (1979) that a "derivative suit is brought by shareholders 
to enforce a claim on behalf of the corporation" (emphasis added). See also 
id., at 484 (referring to actions brought under § 36(b) as "derivative"). 
The fact that derivative suits are brought on behalf of a corporation does 1 
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Petitioners nevertheless contend that an investment com-
pany has an implied right of action under § 36(b). In evaluat-
ing such a claim, our focus must be on the intent of Congress 
when it enacted the statute in question. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 377-378 
(1982). That intent may in turn be discerned by examining a 
number of factors, including the legislative history and pur-
poses of the statute, the identity of the class for whose par-
ticular benefit the statute was passed, the existence of ex-
press statutory remedies adequate to serve the legislative 
purpose, and the traditional role of the states in affording the 
relief claimed. Ibid.; Middlesex County Sewerage Authority 
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U. S. 1, 13-15 (1981). 
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 292-293 (1981); 
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Cort 
v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975). In this case, consideration of 
each of these factors plainly demonstrates that Congress in-
tended the unique right created by § 36(b) to be enforced 
solely by the SEC and security holders of the investment 
company. 
As we have previously noted, Congress adopted the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 because of its concern with 
not mean, however, that all suits brought on behalf of a corporation are I 
derivative. The "on behalf" language in § 36(b) indicates only that the 
right asserted by a shareholder suing under the statute is a "right of the 
corporation"-a proposition confirmed by other aspects of the action: The 
fiduciary duty imposed on advisers by § 36(b) is owed to the company itself 
as well as its shareholders and any recovery obtained in a§ 36(b) action will 
go to the company rather than the plaintiff. SeeS. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 6 
(1970); § 36(b)(3). In this respect, a § 36(b) action is undeniably "deriva-
tive" in the broad sense of that word. See supra, at 4. As we have 
noted, however, Rule 23.1 applies by its terms only to "a derivative action 
brought by one or more shareholders ... to enforce a right of a corporation 
[when] the corporation [has] failed to enforce a right which may properly 
be asserted by it" (emphasis added). The legislative history of § 36(b) 
makes clear that Congress intended the perhaps unique "right of a corpora-
tion" established by § 36(b) to be asserted by the company's security hold-
ers and not by the company itself. Infra, at 12-17. 
' . 
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"the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of invest-
ment companies." Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 480 
(1979). Unlike most corporations, an investment company is 
typically created and managed by a pre-existing external 
organization known as an investment adviser. Id., at 481. 
Because the adviser generally supervises the daily operation 
of the fund and often selects affiliated persons to serve on the 
company's board of directors, the "relationship between in-
vestment advisers and mutual funds is fraught with potential 
conflicts of interest." Ibid., quoting Galfand v. Chestnutt 
Corp., 545 F. 2d 807, 808 (CA2 1976). In order to minimize 
such conflicts of interests, Congress established a scheme 
that regulates most transactions between investment compa-
nies and their advisers, 15 U. S. C. §80a-17; limits the num-
ber of persons affiliated with the adviser who may serve on 
the fund's board of directors, § 80a-10; and requires that fees 
for investment advice and other services be governed by a 
written contract approved both by the directors and the 
shareholders of the fund, § 80a-15. 
In the years following passage of the Act, investment com-
panies enjoyed enormous growth, prompting a number of 
studies of the effectiveness of the Act in protecting investors. 
One such report, commissioned by the SEC, found that in-
vestment advisers often charged mutual funds higher fees 
than those charged the advisers' other clients and further de-
termined that the structure of the industry, even as regu-
lated by the Act, had proven resistant to efforts to moderate 
adviser compensation. Wharton School Study of Mutual 
Funds, H. R. Rep. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 
28--30, 34, 66-67 (1962). Specifically, the study concluded 
that the unaffiliated directors mandated by the Act were "of 
restricted value as an instrument for providing effective 
representation of mutual fund shareholders in dealings be-
tween the fund and its investment adviser." ld., at 34. A 
subsequent report, authored by the SEC itself, noted that in-
vestment advisers were generally compensated on the basis 
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of a fixed percentage of the fund's assets, rather than on 
services rendered or actual expenses. Securities & Ex-
change Commission, Public Policy Implications of Invest-
ment Company Growth, H. R. Rep. No. 89-2337, p. 89 (1966) 
(hereinafter SEC Report). The Commission determined 
that, as a fund's assets grew, this form of payment could 
produce unreasonable fees in light of the economies of scale 
realized in managing a larger portfolio. I d., at 94, 102. 
Furthermore, the Commission concluded that lawsuits by se-
curity holders challenging the reasonableness of adviser fees 
had been largely ineffective due to the standards employed 
by courts to judge the fees. I d., at 132-143. See infra, at 
16 and n. 12. 
In order to remedy this and other perceived inadequacies 
in the Act, the SEC submitted a series of legislative propos-
als to Congress that led to the 1970 Amendments to the Act. 
Some of the proposals Congress ultimately adopted were in-
tended to make the fund's board of directors more inde-
pendent of the adviser and to encourage greater scrutiny of 
adviser contracts. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. §80a-10(a) (re-
quiring that at least 40% of the directors not be "interested 
persons," a broader category than the previously identified 
group of persons "affiliated" with the adviser, see 
§ 80a-2(a)(19)); § 80a-15(c) (requiring independent directors 
as well as shareholders to approve adviser contracts); Burks 
v. Lasker, supra, 441 U. S., at 482-483. The SEC had, 
however, determined that approval of adviser contracts by 
shareholders and independent directors could not alone pro-
vide complete protection of the interests of security holders 
with respect to adviser compensation. See SEC Report, 
supra, at 128-131, 144, 146--147. Accordingly, the Commis-
sion also proposed amending the Act to require "reasonable" 
fees. Id., at 143-147. As initially considered by Congress, 
the bill containing this proposal would have empowered the 
SEC to bring actions to enforce the reasonableness standard 
and to intervene in any similar action brought by or on behalf 
' . 
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of the company. H. R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §8(d) 
(1967); S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1967). 
Representatives of the investment company industry, led 
by amicus Investment Company Institute (ICI), expressed 
concern that enabling the SEC to enforce the fairness of ad-
viser fees might in essence provide the Commission with 
rate-making authority. Accordingly, ICI proposed an alter-
native to the SEC bill which would have provided that ac-
tions to enforce the reasonableness standard "be brought 
only by the company or a security holder thereof on its be-
half." Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967: Hearings on S. 1659 
Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, at pp. 100-101 (1967) (hereinafter 
1967 Hearings). The version that the Senate finally passed, 
however, rejected the industry's suggestion that the invest-
ment company itself be expressly authorized to bring suit. 
S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. §8(d)(6) (1968). Instead, the 
Senate bill required a security holder to make demand on the 
SEC before bringing suit and provided that, if the Commis-
sion refused or failed to bring an action within six months, 
the security holder could maintain a suit against the adviser ~ 
in a "derivative" or representative capacity. Ibid. Like the 
original SEC proposal, however, the Senate bill provided 
that the SEC could intervene in any action brought by the 
company or by a security holder on its behalf. I d., § 22. 
After the bill was reintroduced in the 91st Congress, fur-
ther hearings and consultations with the industry led to the 
present version of§ 36(b). SeeS. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 20(b) (1969); 115 Cong. Rec. 13648 (1969) (Statement of Sen. 
Mcintyre). The new version adopted "a different method of 
testing management compensation." S. Rep. No. 91-184, at 
p. 5 (1969). Instead of containing a statutory standard of 
"reasonableness," the new version imposed a "fiduciary duty" 
on investment advisers. Id., at 5-6. The new bill further 
provided that "either the SEC or a shareholder may sue in 
court on a complaint that a mutual fund's management fees 
-
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involve a breach of fiduciary duty." Id., at 7. The refer-
ence in the previous bill to the derivative or representative 
nature of the security holder action was eliminated, as was 
the earlier provision for intervention by the SEC in actions 
brought by the investment company itself. See S. 2224, 
supra, §22. 
In short, Congress rejected a proposal that would have ex-
pressly made the statutory standard governing adviser fees 
enforceable by the investment company itself and adopted in 
its place a provision containing none of the indications in ear-
lier drafts that the company could bring such a suit. This 
legislative history strongly suggests that, in adopting§ 36(b), 
Congress did not intend to create an implied right of action in 
favor of the investment company. 
That conclusion is further supported by the purposes of the 
statute. As noted above, the SEC proposed the predecessor 
to § 36(b) because of its concern that the structural require-
ments for investment companies imposed by the Act would 
not alone ensure reasonable adviser fees. See supra, at 14. 
Indeed, the Commission concluded that the Act's provisions 
for independent directors and approval of adviser contracts 
had actually frustrated effective challenges to adviser fees. 
In particular, the Commission noted that in the three fully lit-
igated cases in which security holders had attacked such fees 
under state law, the courts had relied on the approval of ad-
viser contracts by security holders or unaffiliated directors to 
uphold the fees. SEC Report, supra, at 132-143.12 For this 
12 In the three cases cited by the SEC, the courts had evaluated the ad-
viser contracts according to common law standards of corporate waste, 
under which an unreasonable or unfair fee might be approved unless the 
court deemed it "unconscionable" or "shocking." SEC Report, supra, at 
142. See Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 54S-549 (D. Colo. 
1963); Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A. 2d 602, 610 (1962); 
Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A. 2d 720, 723 (1961). Simi-
larly, security holders challenging adviser fees under the Investment Com-
pany Act itself had been required to prove gross abuse of trust. See 
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reason, the Senate Report proposing the final version of the 
statute noted that, while shareholder and directorial ap-
proval of the adviser's contract are entitled to serious consid-
eration by the court in a § 36(b) action, "such consideration 
would not be controlling in determining whether or not the 
fee encompassed a breach of fiduciary duty." S. Rep. No. 
91-184, at p. 15 (1969); see id., at p. 5. In contrast to its 
approach in other aspects of the 1970 amendments, then, 
Congress decided not to rely solely on the fund's directors to 
assure reasonable adviser fees, notwithstanding the in-
creased disinterestedness of the board. See Burks v. 
Lasker, supra, 441 U. S., at 481-482 n. 10 and 484. See also 
SEC Report, supra, at 14&-148 (right of SEC and security 
holders to bring actions essential; although role of disin-
terested directors should be enhanced, "even a requirement 
that all of the directors of an externally managed investment 
company be persons unaffiliated with the company's adviser-
underwriter would not be an effective check on advisory fees 
and other forms of management compensation"). This policy 
choice strongly indicates that Congress intended security 
holder and SEC actions under § 36(b), on the one hand, and 
directorial approval of adviser contracts, on the other, to act 
as independent checks on excessive fees. 
Nor do other factors on which we have relied to identify an 
implied cause of action support petitioners' claim that the 
right asserted by a shareholder in a§ 36(b) action could be en-
forced by the investment company. First, investment com-
panies, as well as the investing public, are undoubtedly 
within "the class for whose especial benefit" § 36(b) was en-
acted, Cort v. Ash, supra, 422 U. S., at 78 (emphasis in origi-
nal), seen. 11, supra. Section§ 36(b)'s express provision for 
actions by security holders, however, ensures that, even if 
the company's directors cannot bring an action in the fund's 
name, the company's rights under the statute can be fully 
Brown v. Bullock, 194 F . Supp. 207 (SDNY 1961), aff'd, 294 F. 2d 415 
(CA2 1961). See 1967 Hearings, supra, at 117-118. 
' . 
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vindicated by plaintiffs authorized to act on its behalf. For 
this reason, it is unnecessary to infer a right of action in favor 
of the corporation in order to serve the statute's "broad re-
medial purpose." Cf., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 
--U.S.--,- (1983). See also Middlesex County 
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 
supra, 453 U.S., at 13-15. Second, because §36(b) creates 
an entirely new right, it was obviously not enacted "in a stat-
utory context in which an implied private remedy [had] al-
ready been recognized by the courts." Cf., Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, supra, 456 U. S., at 378; 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, supra, at--. Third, 
a corporation's rights against its directors or third parties 
with whom it has contracted are generally governed by state, 
not federal, law. Burks v. Lasker, supra, 441 U. S., at 478. 
See C ort v. Ash, supra, 422 U. S., at 78. 
IV 
A shareholder derivative action is an exception to the nor-
mal rule that the proper party to bring a suit on behalf of a 
corporation is the corporation itself, acting through its direc-
tors or a majority of its shareholders. Accordingly, Rule 
23.1, which establishes procedures designed to prevent mi-
nority shareholders from abusing this equitable device, is ad-
dressed only to situations in which shareholders seek to en-
force a right that "may properly be asserted" by the 
corporation itself. In contrast, as the language of§ 36(b) in-
dicates, Congress intended the fiduciary duty imposed on in-
vestment advisers by that statute to be enforced solely by se-
curity holders of the investment company and the SEC. It 
would be anomalous, therefore, to apply a Rule intended to 
prevent a shareholder from improperly suing in place of the 
corporation to a statute, like § 36(b), conferring a right which 
the corporation itself cannot enforce. It follows that Rule 
23.1 does not apply to an action brought by a shareholder 
under § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act and that the 
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plaintiff in such a case need not first make a demand upon the 
fund's directors before bringing suit. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore 
Affirmed. 
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